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Bread, peace and the attrition of power: Economic
events and German election results
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Abstract
Aggregate votes for incumbent parties in post-war Germany were
determined by the weighted-average growth of real per capita dispos-
able income and the attrition of power, especially when the Federal
Chancellor sought re-election more than twice. Similar to earlier re-
sults for the US, each percentage point of per capita real disposable in-
come growth sustained over the legislative term yielded approximately
4 percentage points in votes in Germany. No other economic variables
add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model.
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
There may be many reasons for supporting or opposing a government. How-
ever, German elections should be viewed as a sequence of referenda on the
government’s economic record. The growth of real per capita disposable in-
come explains all the variations in aggregate voting outcomes. If a German
chancellor sought re-election more than twice, as in 1961, 1994 and 1998, he
or she received significantly fewer votes.
Although it is obvious that economic conditions affect voting behavior,
there is a large body of literature examining the economic variables that are
most important for voter decisions.1 The main questions are:
1. Are voters backward- (Key 1966) or forward-looking (Downs 1957)?
2. If voters are backward-looking, how far back do they look and how
much do they discount past events?
3. Do voters vote according to their pocketbooks or according to the
national economic situation (Lewis-Beck 1988)?
4. How does the political system (accountability) affect the importance
of economic variables?
We find support for the hypothesis that voters are backward-looking and
that they consider the whole legislative term with almost no discounting of
past events. They vote according to their pocketbooks, i.e., the per capita
disposable income growth. Comparing our results for Germany to those of
Hibbs (2008) for the US, we find that additional weighted-average per capita
real growth in disposable income results in a similar vote share increase in
both countries, even though the US and Germany have different political
systems. These results raise questions about some of the stylized facts sum-
marized by Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000, p. 114). Furthermore, in our
estimation, inflation is irrelevant, contrary to stylized fact that inflation and
unemployment/growth are relevant for vote functions.
Our approach follows the literature explaining aggregate votes in terms
of economic fundamentals. Fair (1978) identifies the change in real eco-
nomic activity in the year of the election and a high discount rate on past
economic performance. Lewis-Beck (1988) argues that voters do not vote
on the basis of their own personal economic situation, but rather on the
1See Drazan (2000), Hibbs (2006), Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and Mueller (2003)
for surveys of the literature.
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national economic performance. Hibbs (1982, 2000) identifies the weighted-
average growth of real disposable personal income over the complete term
of office as the only important economic variable that explains voting in US
presidential elections. Whereas authors such as Frey and Garbers (1972),
Kirchga¨ssner (1974, 1985) and Frey and Schneider (1979) were pioneers in
the field of popularity and policy reaction functions and thoroughly ex-
amined Germany, they used popularity rather than election results as the
explanatory variable.2 Obviously, there are not enough data from post-war
elections in Germany. However, we explain election results instead of polling
results and therefore avoid the problems with polls: they cover fewer per-
sons, do not have real effects and target subjects without advance notice
and not after an election campaign.
Whereas the duties of the German federal president are largely rep-
resentative and ceremonial, power is exercised by the Federal Chancellor
(“Bundeskanzler”) who heads the Federal Government and thus the execu-
tive branch of the political system. He or she is elected by and is responsible
to the “Bundestag”, Germany’s main chamber of parliament, to which mem-
bers are elected for a 4-year term. In the election voters cast two votes, the
first called “Erststimme” and the second “Zweitstimme”. The first vote is
to elect members of parliament in single-seat constituencies using a first-
past-the-post voting system. Aggregated second votes determine the seats
a party receives in the Bundestag, although the definite number of seats
depends on some special rules.3 Therefore, the main vote is the second vote
because it determines the weight for a party and, indirectly, the chancellor.
With just one exception in post-World War II Germany, no single party has
ever achieved an absolute majority of seats in the parliament. Therefore,
parties join a coalition that elects a member of the largest coalition party
as chancellor. These coalitions of parties usually hold for a whole legislative
period of 4 years.
2Cusack (1999), Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (2000) and Geys and Vermeir(2008) use popu-
larity ratings as well.
31. A party has to get 5 percent or three seats in single-seat constituencies to get the
proportional share. 2. A seat won in a single-seat constituency is guaranteed. 3. The
proportional share is calculated with reference to single states.
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2 The Model
The bread and peace model (Hibbs 2000) assumes that growth of real dispos-
able personal income per capita is the best single-variable election predictor
because real disposable personal income includes income from all market
sources and is adjusted for inflation, taxes, government transfer payments,
and population growth. It also includes the income effects of unemployment.
To determine the election result we define as vote share the share of
votes4 for parties that were members of the ruling coalition in the legislative
period prior to the election. Hibbs (2000) and Fair (1978) use the two-
party vote share in their estimations to incorporate the effect whereby there
are only two presidential candidates, but sometimes there is a third. They
implicitly accumulate votes for the third candidate in proportion to the votes
for candidates of the Republican and Democrat parties. This is appropriate
for the US, but is not necessary for the proportional system used in Germany
whereby a voter who wants to support the government may vote for a small
coalition party.
We exclude the 1969 and 1983 election terms. From 1966 to 1969 there
was a grand coalition of both large parties and therefore even voters disap-
pointed with economic growth probably voted for one of these parties. In
1983 the government coalition was only in office for 6 months because one
party switched the coalition during the term, and therefore a vote for the
current government could have been a vote against the low performance of
the predecessor.
The equation used to generate the data depicted in Figure 1 is:
Vt = β0 + β1
(
ft∆ lnRt +
∑lt
j=1 λ
j∆ lnRt−j
ft +
∑lt
j=1 λ
j
)
+ β2DUR, (1)
where
• V is the sum of the vote shares of the parties that make up the gov-
erning coalition at the time of election.
• R is the per capita growth in disposable personal income deflated
by the consumer price index, and ∆ lnRt is the annualized quarter-
on-quarter percentage rate of growth, ∆ lnRt = ln(Rt/Rt−1) ∗ 400
expressed in annualized percentage points (multiplication by 400).
4We use the share of valid “Zweitstimmen”.
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Incumbent vote share V 1972–2005 N = 9 elections
R2=0.74 Adj. R2=0.66 Root MSE=2.99
Coef. estimate Std. error p-value
Constant β0 46.4 1.81 .0000
Weighted-average 3.09 .98 .0194
per capita real disposable
personal income growth
rate, % (β1)
Chancellor for re-election −4.22 2.17 .0998
more than twice
DUR (β2)
Table 1: Model equation estimates for quarterly data
• lt is the number of quarters (years) from the last election to the current
election t, excluding the quarter (but not the year) of the previous
election.
• ft is a variable that captures the weight of the election quarter and
equals the fraction of elapsed days on election day in that quarter
(year) to the number of all days in the quarter (year).
• ft+∑ltj=1 λj is a normalizing constant, so that β1 registers the response
of vote to movements in the weighted average of real income growth
rates.
• DUR is a dummy variable that equals 1 only if the chancellor is seeking
re-election for the third time (i.e., in 1961 and 1994) and 1.25 if the
chancellor is seeking re-election for the fourth time (i.e., in 1998).5
The parameters used to draw the trend line in Figure 1 are β0 = 46.4,
β1 = 3.09 (as estimated in Table 1) and β2 = 0 because DUR= 0 for most
elections. To demonstrate the attrition of power effect in 1994 and 1998, the
predicted vote shares for these years (using the estimated DUR variable) are
indicated by triangles.
5Before 1990 people from East Germany were not allowed to cast their vote for the
Bundestag because the former GDR (East Germany) was an independent state. There-
fore, in 1994 chancellor Kohl sought re-election for the third time in the former West
Germany (approximately 83 percent of the voters) but for the first time in East Germany
(approximately 17 percent of the voters). However, weighting the DUR variable for 1994
and 1998 to incorporate the reunification of Germany does not change our results.
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Figure 1: Weighted-average real per capita growth in disposable income and
vote share of the incumbent party during 1972–2005 (quarterly data).
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Because quarterly data for per capita disposable personal income are
not available prior to 1970, we used yearly data to calculate Figure 2. The
results are shown in Table 2.
Figure 2: Weighted-average real per capita growth in disposable income and
vote share of the incumbent party during 1953–2005 (yearly data).
Incumbent vote share V 1953–2005 N = 13 elections
R2=0.88 Adj. R2=0.85 Root MSE=2.85
Coef. estimate Std. error p-value
Constant β0 45.9 1.53 .0000
Weighted-average 4.44 .65 .0000
per capita real disposable
personal income growth
rate, % (β1)
Chancellor for re-election −7.33 1.74 .0018
more than twice
DUR (β2)
Table 2: Model equation estimates for yearly data
In Germany, from a constant of 45.9 percent, each percentage point of per
capita real growth in disposable income sustained over the legislative term
yields 4.44 percentage points in votes. Even though the political systems
of the US and Germany are quite different, the parameter estimates are
astonishingly similar to the results of Hibbs (2000, 2008) and even Kramer
http://www.digibib.tu-bs.de/?docid=00023651 07/11/2008
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(1971).6
If the economy expands at a rate equal to the post-war average (1.67
percent), the incumbent coalition may expect a vote share of 53.31 percent.
There is a bias that favors the parties in power. Table 4 in the Appendix
shows that the largest prediction errors occur for 1957, 1961, and 2005.
In the 1961 election one of the opposition parties (FDP) campaigned to
enter a coalition with the incumbent party but to get rid of the incumbent
chancellor, and obtained a vote share approximately corresponding to the
sum of the prediction error and the attrition of power effect. The election
in 2005 was early because the chancellor had lost a vote of confidence.
The only minor difference between the data for the US and Germany is
the weighting parameter λ. In our estimates, λ = 0.99 provides the best
results in terms of goodness of fit, whereas Hibbs (2008) used a value of
0.909. However, Hibbs (2000) cannot reject the λ = 1 hypothesis and our
estimates generate similar results if we use the λ values used by Hibbs (2000,
2008).
The bread and peace model is of significance not only because it iden-
tifies fundamentals that are important for election results, but also because
it makes it clear that no other variable adds value or significantly perturbs
its coefficients. Furthermore, Hibbs (2008) explains election outcomes in
terms of objectively measured political-economic fundamentals and does
not use dummy variables that are coded arbitrarily. However, the argu-
ment that voters eventually tire of a politician or a party cannot be rejected
(Abramowitz 1988, Campbell and Wink 1990, Haynes and Stone 1994), espe-
cially for the German elections 1961 and 1998. Therefore it is not surprising
that attrition of power is an additional variable explaining German election
results. Fair (1996, p. 95) uses a duration variable DUR that increases by
k = 0.25 for each additional consecutive term of office for a party, starting
with a value of 1 if the party has been in power for three consecutive terms.
However, we define DUR in terms of the chancellor rather than the party
or coalition in office. The US president is not prone to the same attrition of
power as a German chancellor because the US president can be re-elected
just once, whereas a German chancellor can hold office as long as his or her
coalition wins majorities.
On the other hand it is impossible to identify a peace effect in Germany.
The number of German military fatalities due to unprovoked, hostile deploy-
6In his seminal paper, Kramer (1971) estimates a 4–5 percentage point increase in the
vote share for each percentage point rise in the real income growth rate in the election
year. Kramer uses a different time span (pre-election year versus the whole legislative
period) and a different explanatory variable.
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ment of German armed forces in foreign conflicts not sanctioned by a formal
parliamentary declaration of war, which is the Hibbs (2008) definition of
the peace variable, is zero for the whole period. Fair (1996) also corrects
for war years, but defines war elections as dominated by World War I or II.
The period in the present study does not cover this time. To summarize,
it is impossible to confirm the peace part of the bread and peace model for
Germany, arguably because peace is so important to German voters that no
chancellor has dared to send troops to intervene in foreign civil wars or to
authorize military forces without parliamentary approval.
3 Variables omitted
To test the robustness of the estimated model, we investigated a number
of variables other than disposable income growth and duration that are
highlighted in the literature on vote shares. The results of these regression
experiments are shown in Table 3. The second column of each row reports
parameter estimates, t-ratios and significance levels (p-values) for the addi-
tional test variable. The third column gives the significance level for the null
hypothesis of parameter equivalence between the bread, peace and attrition
of power model coefficients obtained for each test regression equation and
the corresponding bread and peace estimates in Table 1.7
Old news In our model we assume that backward-looking voters review
the whole election period but ignore economic growth that occurred
earlier. Therefore, we have to test if economic performance prior to the
last election influences the voting decision in the current election. As
in Hibbs (2000), we use the lagged incumbent parties vote share, which
summarizes the economic performance of the pre-pre-election period,
termed “old news”, as the test variable. The coefficient estimate of
old news reveals that there is no spillover effect of past performance
of incumbent parties on current vote share. The coefficient estimate
for the vote share of the incumbent party in the previous election is
essentially zero and the p-value for the hypothesis of joint parameter
equivalence is 0.42.
Inflation and unemployment From the beginning of voting economics,
inflation and unemployment have been the most popular measures of
performance of incumbents parties and voters since they benefit and
7Quarterly data are not available prior to 1970, and therefore the model robustness
tests are based on the data set for 1972–2005.
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punish the government, respectively. Here we included the weighted
average inflation and weighted average unemployment over the term
as an additional variable. Both variables were not significant and did
not add value to the earlier estimated model in Table 1. Similarly, a
change in unemployment is redundant, with a non-significant t-value,
and a p-value of 0.99 shows the parameter equivalence to the estimates
in Table 1.
Fair’s economy Test variables 5,6 and 7 are Fair’s three well-known vari-
ables: g3, the average growth rate of real per capita GDP in the first
three quarters of the election year; p, the absolute value of inflation
over the election term; and n-good, the number of “good news” quar-
ters during the term in which annual GDP growth exceeds potential
GDP growth, which we calculate using a Rodrick-Prescott 100 filter.8
The result demonstrates that these three variable adds no explanatory
power to the estimated regression. However, the “good news” variable
is significant if we define a reference value to make it significant or
define it as the number of quarters in which GDP growth is higher
than average growth.9 Test regressions 5, 6 and 7 demonstrate that
the Fair variables do not add any value to the Germany bread and
peace model.
Macroeconomic volatility In the literature (Cameron 1978, Rodrik 1999)
the macroeconomic stability of economic wellbeing is identified as an-
other important variable for democratic political outcomes. Following
Hibbs (2000) we tested volatility as the standard deviation of dispos-
able income growth over the term in test regression 8. Volatility was
also insignificant and the p-value demonstrates parameter equivalence
to the coefficient estimates in Table 1. We also tested volatility based
on inflation, but again obtained insignificant results.
Fiscal conservatism Pelzman (1992) found that each percentage point of
growth in real federal spending per capita sustained for a year de-
creases the vote share of the incumbent party in presidential elections
by more than 3 percentage points. The reason is that voters realize
8Since GDP growth patterns in Germany are dynamic over time in the sense that
average growth was approximately 2.64 before reunification in 1991 and approximately
1.75 thereafter, we have incorporated the concept of good-news quarters as quarters with
growth greater than potential output growth.
9Fair uses a reference value of 3.2 (and 2.9 in some cases) without reference to funda-
mentals, but only to obtain a better fit.
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that additional fiscal expenditure will create excess tax burdens on
them. Test regressions 9 and 10 demonstrate that cumulative changes
in real per capita expenditure over the term and cumulative changes in
government spending in proportion to GDP had no significant impact
on the vote share of the incumbent coalition.
Changes in wealth: Stock prices Fama (1990) and Schwert (1990) pro-
pose that stock price change is a common indicator of investor market
sentiment and forward macroeconomic expectations. Gleisner (1992)
and Haynes and Stone (1994) report that each percentage point in-
crease in the Dow Jones Industrial Average registered between January
and October of the election year yields a vote share harvest of between
0.4 and 0.7 percentage points for the incumbent party’s presidential
candidate. To test the sensitivity of vote share to market sentiments
and macroeconomic expectations, we used the DAX30 index. Condi-
tioned on the estimated bread and peace model test regression 11, we
find that stock price changes have no significant impact on the vote
share of the incumbent coalition.
Interest rate spread Forward-looking voters may use interest rate spread
as a predictor of output changes in advance (Estrella and Hardouvelis
1991, Estrella and Mishkin 1997), i.e., they expect that the higher
the interest rate spread, the higher will be future output growth and
lower will be the future probability of a recession. The argument is
endorsed by Berry et al. (1996), who find evidence that interest rate
spread affects employment, growth and inflation, which in turn directly
or indirectly affects voter behavior. Combining forward-looking voters
and interest spread as an indicator of future growth, it follows that
the higher the interest rate spread, the higher would be the vote share
of the incumbent’s party. In the present study, interest rate spread
is calculated as the difference between the long-term (10-year) bond
yield and the short-term bond yield (bonds with a 1-year maturity
period). Test regression results 12 shows that interest rate spread has
no significant impact on the estimated vote share in Table 1.
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Model: Vt = β0 + β1
(
ft∆ lnRt+
∑lt
j=1
λj∆ lnRt−j
ft+
∑lt
j=1
λj
)
+ β2DUR + β3test variables
Signif. level for
Test variable(s) Test variable equivalence of
parameter βˆ0, βˆ1, βˆ2 to
estimates benchmark
(t-ratio/ estimates in
signif. level) Table 1 row 1
1. Old news 0.5 0.42
(Incumbent coalition’s vote share (1.83/0.12)
at last election)
2. Inflation 0.79 0.98
(0.46/0.66)
3. Unemployment rate −0.20 0.97
(−0.46/0.65) 0.99
4. Change in unemployment −0.30 0.99
(−0.48/0.65)
5. Election year output growth 0.35 0.97
(0.58/0.58)
6. Inflation over the term 0.15 0.89
(0.88/0.42)
7. Number of high-growth 0.68 0.74
quarters, good news (1.15/0.30)
8. Volatility (standard deviation) 0.065 0.99
of ∆ lnR over the term (0.07/0.94) 0.99
9. Per capita real govt. 0.02 1.0
expenditure over the term (0.09/0.93)
10. Govt. expenditure in 0.04 1.0
proportion to GDP over the term (0.10/0.92) 1.0
11. Stock prices: percent change −0.17 0.81
in DAX30 for 10 months prior (−1.77/0.13)
to the election month
12. Average yield spread (10-year bonds −1.03 0.95
rate minus 1-year bond rate) (−0.65/0.54)
during the 3 months
following the election
Table 3: Robustness of the model to additional variables
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4 Conclusions
In Germany, the votes in general elections are determined by the weighted-
average growth of real per capita disposable income during the election term.
A coalition of parties that offer average growth during the term earn a vote
share of 53.3 percent and each additional percentage point of growth adds
4.44 percentage points of votes. This result coincides with the Hibbs (2000,
2008) bread and peace model for US presidential elections. However, a Hibbs
(2000) type of peace effect is absent, arguably because peace is so important
to German voters that no chancellor has dared to send troops to intervene
in foreign civil wars or to authorize military forces without parliamentary
approval. Furthermore, in the 1961, 1994 and 1998 elections, the vote share
was significantly lower because the chancellor was seeking re-election more
than twice and was a victim of the attrition of power effect. The estimated
results reveal that the incumbent coalition’s vote share is squeezed by 4.21
and 5.26 percent if the chancellor seeks re-election for the third and fourth
times, respectively. This result coincides with the Fair (1996) “duration”
effect and the time-for-change effect in Abramowitz (1988, 2001). As in
Hibbs (2000), all other economic variables do not add value or significantly
perturb the equation’s coefficients.
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Appendix
Election Incumbent % % Prediction Weighted real Attrition Attrition
Year parties incumbent predicted error average income of of
parties vote real growth power power
income effect effect
growth on votes on votes
1953 CDU/FDP/GB/DP 63.9 66.01 2.11 4.53 20.13 0 0
1957 CDU/FDP/GB/DP 65.9 61.17 −4.73 3.44 15.26 0 0
1961 CDU 45.3 49.94 4.64 2.56 11.37 1.00 −7.33
1965 CDU/FDP 57.1 56.33 −0.77 2.35 10.42 0 0
1972 SPD/FDP 54.2 55.93 1.73 2.26 10.02 0 0
1976 SPD/FDP 50.5 50.07 −0.43 0.94 4.16 0 0
1980 SPD/FDP 53.5 52.91 −0.59 1.58 7.04 0 0
1987 CDU/FDP 53.4 50.73 −2.67 1.09 4.86 0 0
1990 CDU/FDP 54.8 55.00 0.20 2.05 9.10 0 0
1994 CDU/FDP 48.3 46.87 −1.43 1.87 8.30 1.00 −7.33
1998 CDU/FDP 41.3 38.73 −2.57 0.45 1.98 1.25 −9.16
2002 SPD/Gru¨ne 47.1 48.11 1.01 0.50 2.23 0 0
2005 SPD/Gru¨ne 42.3 45.80 3.50 -0.02 -0.09 0 0
Table 4: Votes, predictions and effects of fundamental determinants in Ger-
man elections (fits and effects computed from equation estimates in Table
2.)
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